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Abstract  
This paper studies the drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors in 
curbing earnings management in an international setting. We identify three distinct drivers and 
propose two competing hypotheses: the hometown advantage hypothesis predicts that because of 
proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutions have a comparative advantage over 
foreign institutions in deterring earnings management, whereas the global investor hypothesis 
predicts that foreign institutions have a comparative advantage because of their proclivity toward 
activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies. Consistent with the hometown 
advantage hypothesis, in aggregate, domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is associated 
with less earnings management; the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves as 
they gain proximity to monitoring information. Consistent with the global investor hypothesis, the 
monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves in environments of greater agency 
conflicts or weaker governance controls or when the gap in monitoring technology between 
foreign and domestic institutions widens. 
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1. Introduction  
As global capital markets continue to liberalize and integrate, institutional investors are 
playing an increasingly important role in the world economy. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), assets under the management of institutional investors rose more than 
sevenfold since 1990 to around $100 trillion in 2015.1 Recognizing their sizeable global footprint 
and influence, policy makers from different countries are putting increasing pressure on 
institutional investors to play a more active governance role in their investee firms across 
jurisdictions. Despite their growing significance, we have incomplete knowledge about the 
economic drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors when they invest 
globally. In this paper, we aim to gain a richer understanding of this issue by analyzing the 
comparative monitoring advantages of domestic and foreign institutional investors in constraining 
earnings management. We are motivated to study this specific research question because: 1) the 
domestic-versus-foreign classification allows us to identify three distinct drivers behind the 
monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors, and 2) extant theories and evidence offer 
conflicting predictions regarding which type—domestic or foreign institutional investors—is more 
effective in deterring earnings management.  
Drawing from the literature, we posit that proximity to local information is the main 
driver behind the comparative monitoring advantage of domestic institutional investors. 
Monitoring effectiveness critically depends on information acquisition and processing costs. 
Compared to foreign peers, domestic institutional investors have an unparalleled advantage in 
acquiring and processing monitoring information because of their geographic, linguistic, and 
cultural proximity to local investee firms. While it is reasonable to argue that technological 
advances have significantly lessened the negative effect of distance on information acquisition and 
processing costs, a large body of literature on spatial economics and international finance suggests 
                                                            
1 http://www.imf.org/external/publications/index.htm 
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that locals still enjoy a substantial comparative advantage over nonlocals in their ability to access 
more and better information concerning the hometown firms. For example, within national 
confines, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that the investment portfolios of even professional 
money managers, who should have state-of-the-art tools to acquire and process information over 
distance, exhibit a home bias, that is, a strong preference for locally headquartered firms. Across 
borders, Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) find in a sample of 32 countries that analysts who reside in a 
country make more precise earnings forecasts for firms in that country than non-resident analysts. 
They call this greater precision “local analyst advantage” and interpret it as evidence that local 
analysts are better informed than foreign analysts. Further, the earnings management literature 
establishes that information asymmetry between firms and external stakeholders is a necessary 
condition for opportunistic financial reporting (Ayers, Ramalingegowda, and Yeung 2011). This 
asymmetric information problem becomes especially acute in an international setting because in 
such settings the dimensions of proximity, or “distance,” expand beyond just physical distance to 
include distances in languages, regulations, cultural norms and so on. Information communicated 
through subtle hints such as intonation and body language is more easily lost over “distance” in an 
international setting. Therefore, motivated by extant literature, we propose the hometown 
advantage hypothesis, which predicts that because of their proximity to monitoring information, 
domestic institutional investors have a comparative advantage over their foreign peers in curbing 
earnings management. 
For foreign institutional investors, we identify proclivity toward activism and superior 
monitoring technologies as the two key drivers behind their comparative monitoring advantage. 
Compared to domestic counterparts, foreign institutional investors are more independent monitors 
because they are less likely to have business dealings with local investee firms and are less prone 
to local political pressure (Gillan and Starks 2003; Tsang, Xie, and Xin 2016). Foreign institutions 
also have a deeper understanding of a broader set of governance tools due to their global 
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investment experience. That global knowledge and experience puts them in a better position to 
prod firms to adopt the best governance practices (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos 2011). In 
addition, foreign institutions are equipped with superior monitoring technologies, because they 
have access to the global talent pool and possess the latest communication and analytical tools 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000). We argue that these technological advantages allow foreign 
institutional investors to perform the governance function more effectively because superior 
technology reduces the very transaction costs that distance engenders, facilitates economies of 
scale (e.g., allowing foreign institutions to analyze common governance issues more efficiently 
and accurately), and lowers the costs of coordinating activist campaigns among shareholders. 
Consistent with these arguments, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that firm value is more positively 
associated with foreign, rather than domestic, institutional ownership. Aggarwal et al. (2011) find 
that foreign, but not domestic, institutional investors affect a wide range of corporate governance 
attributes. Tsang et al. (2016) find that foreign institutional investors have a larger positive impact 
on firms’ voluntary disclosure than domestic peers. Therefore, inspired by the existing literature, 
we propose the global investor hypothesis, which predicts that because of their proclivity toward 
activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies, foreign institutional investors 
have a comparative advantage over their domestic peers in constraining earnings management. 
To test the hypotheses, we construct a sample of 2,724 institutional investors that held 
stocks in 11,403 firms across 29 non-U.S. countries from 2001 to 2013. We find that in aggregate, 
domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is significantly associated with less earnings 
management. This result holds after we use alternative earnings management measures, control for 
relevant firm and country characteristics, and implement various robustness checks including two-
way clustering at firm-year levels, country, industry, and/or firm fixed effects, and four different 
endogeneity checks.  
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To provide richer evidence for the hometown advantage hypothesis, we propose and test 
two corollaries—H1.a and H1.b. Given the importance of information acquisition and processing 
costs, it logically follows that the comparative advantage of domestic institutional investors over 
foreign counterparts in curbing earnings management is more (less) pronounced when information 
asymmetry is higher (lower) (H1.a). Following the literature, we use two sets of proxies to 
measure information asymmetry. First, to capture firm-level information asymmetry, we use firm 
size and analyst coverage (Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). 
Second, to capture country-level information asymmetry, we use prevalence of insider trading and 
disclosure quality from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). Consistent with H1.a, we 
find that the comparative advantage of domestic institutional investors over their foreign peers in 
constraining earnings management is more pronounced when investee firms are smaller, have 
fewer analysts following them, or are located in countries with more rampant insider trading or 
poor disclosure quality. H1.b predicts that as foreign institutional investors gain proximity to 
monitoring information, they close the gap in monitoring effectiveness between themselves and 
their domestic peers. Consistent with H1.b, we find that foreign institutions who share cultural 
traits similar to the host country or are familiar with the host country’s accounting standards are as 
effective as domestic institutions in reducing earnings management. Notably, foreign institutions 
from the same geographic region are more effective than domestic institutions in curbing earnings 
management.  
We propose and test two corollaries of the global investor hypothesis—H2.a and H2.b. 
Since proclivity toward activism is one of the two key drivers behind the comparative monitoring 
advantage of foreign institutional investors, we test whether this advantage is larger when agency 
conflict is more severe or corporate governance is weaker (H2.a). Consistent with H2.a, we find 
that foreign institutional investors are more effective at restraining earnings management in firms 
with higher, but not lower, levels of free cash flow and that ownership by foreign institutional 
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investors from common-law countries is associated with less earnings management in civil-law 
countries. Since superior monitoring technology is the other key driver, we test whether the 
comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors is larger when their 
technological superiority is more pronounced (H2.b). Consistent with H2.b, foreign institutional 
ownership is significantly related to less earnings management in emerging countries, but not in 
developed countries, and this relation is driven by foreign institutions from developed countries. 
Further, whereas domestic institutional ownership is significantly and more negatively linked to 
earnings management in developed countries than foreign counterparts, that statistical difference 
disappears in emerging countries.  
Our paper makes several contributions. We provide insights into the economic drivers 
behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors, highlighting the conditions 
under which domestic and foreign institutions become more effective in restraining opportunistic 
financial reporting. Consequently, this paper extends the within-country results of hometown 
advantage to an international setting and reconciles the seemingly conflicting results in the 
literature. Specifically, Ayers et al (2011) and Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) 
find for U.S. firms that local institutions enjoy a hometown advantage over distant institutions in 
mitigating earnings management. This evidence appears to be in direct conflict with the growing 
evidence that foreign, but not domestic, institutional investors play a more effective governance 
role in their global portfolio firms (e.g., Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011; Tsang et 
al. 2016).  
By highlighting that proximity to information is a key driver behind the monitoring 
effectiveness of global institutional investors, we complement the fledging but rapidly growing 
literature on the influence of institutional investors around the world. Fang, Maffett, and Zhang 
(2015) find that U.S. mutual funds are instrumental in pushing for the global convergence of 
financial reporting practices. Tsang et al. (2016) find that foreign, rather than domestic, 
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institutional ownership leads to greater improvement in firms’ voluntary disclosures. Our results 
help motivate the economic rationale behind such actions taken by foreign institutional investors. 
Lastly, by exploring the conditions for the comparative monitoring advantages of foreign and 
domestic institutional investors, this paper sheds light on the strengths and limitations of global 
investors in influencing corporate behaviors, thereby underscoring policy initiatives that can be 
taken to enhance the market discipline for corporations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data and the key measures of 
institutional ownership and earnings management; Section 4 presents empirical results; and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Prior literature and hypotheses development 
We posit that the key driver behind the comparative advantage of domestic institutional 
investors in monitoring earnings management is their proximity to monitoring information. This 
conjecture is premised on two insights from the extant literature: 1) monitoring effectiveness 
critically depends on information acquisition and processing costs (Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008); 
and 2) information asymmetry should be of first-order importance to monitoring earnings 
management in an international setting. The central role that information asymmetry plays in 
investors’ ability to acquire and process information necessary for restraining earnings 
management logically leads to the prediction that compared to foreign peers, domestic institutional 
investors have a comparative advantage in monitoring opportunistic financial reporting. 
Compared to foreign peers, domestic institutional investors have an unparalleled 
monitoring advantage in acquiring and processing information relevant to a local investee firm due 
to their geographic, linguistic, and cultural proximity to not only the firm, but also to locals such 
as resident politicians, stock analysts, rating agencies, and news reporters. This unparalleled access 
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to local information is noted in the popular press and supported by voluminous empirical 
evidence. For example, a 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal reported that some investors had 
special access to top executives and “facts and body language [flew] from public companies to 
handpicked recipients.”2 The literature finds that because of geographic proximity, locals have 
access to more and better information than non-locals (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999) for 
professional money managers, Giannini, Irvine, and Shu (2013) for individual investors, Lerner 
(1995) for venture capitalists, Hau (2001) for professional traders, Malloy (2005) for equity 
analysts, and Butler (2008) for investment banks). 
The earnings management literature shows that information asymmetry between firms 
and external stakeholders is a necessary condition for opportunistic financial reporting and plays a 
central role in determining whether investors can effectively monitor earnings management (Ayers 
et al. 2011; Chhaochharia et al. 2012). In addition, several other strands of literature demonstrate 
that information asymmetry is of critical importance in driving investors’ cross-border actions. For 
example, the literature on international portfolio allocation (see, e.g., Kang and Stulz 1997) 
identifies informational asymmetry as the main driver behind the concentration of portfolio 
investment in domestic assets known as the “home bias.” The literature on international goods and 
financial assets transactions underscores information asymmetry as the main determinant of the 
pattern of international transactions (see, e.g., Gordon and Bovenberg 1996; Portes and Rey 2005). 
Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004) show that a model with perfect information cannot explain one 
of the stylized facts in international finance—the positive contemporaneous relationship between 
net equity flows and returns. Rather, a model in which foreign investors are less informed than 
domestic investors can explain the stylized fact. Therefore, based on these branches of literature, it 
                                                            
2 The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2015, “How Some Investors Get Special Access to 
Companies,” by Serena Ng and Anton Troianovski. 
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is reasonable to conclude that information asymmetry should be of first-order importance in 
monitoring earnings management in an international setting. 
Particularly relevant to our study are Ayers et al. (2011) and Bae et al. (2008). Ayers et 
al. (2011) use geographic distance to proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information. 
Based on U.S. data, they find that local institutions enjoy a “hometown advantage” in that they are 
associated with less opportunistic financial reporting than distant institutions. Bae et al. (2008) 
find for a sample of 32 countries that analysts who reside in a country make more precise earnings 
forecasts for firms in that country than non-resident analysts. They call this greater precision 
“local analyst advantage” and interpret it as evidence that local analysts are better informed than 
foreign analysts. Following the literature (e.g., Bae et al. 2008; Ferreira and Matos 2008), we 
define domestic (foreign) institutional investors as those domiciled in the same (different) country 
in which the stock is issued, and propose the following hypothesis: 
H1 (Hometown Advantage Hypothesis): Because of their proximity to monitoring 
information, domestic institutional investors have a comparative advantage over their 
foreign peers in constraining earnings management.  
Given the pivotal role of information asymmetry in institutions’ ability to constrain earnings 
management, we propose the following corollary of H1: 
H1.a: The “Hometown Advantage” is more pronounced when information asymmetry is 
higher.  
As the primary driver behind the comparative monitoring advantage of domestic institutional 
investors is their proximity to monitoring information, it naturally follows that their comparative 
advantage diminishes as foreign institutional investors gain proximity to monitoring information. 
Therefore, we propose the following corollary of H1: 
H1.b: As they gain proximity to monitoring information, foreign institutional investors 
close the gap in monitoring effectiveness between themselves and their domestic peers. 
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We posit that the main drivers behind the comparative monitoring advantage of foreign 
institutional investors are: 1) their proclivity toward activism, and 2) their ability to deploy 
superior monitoring technologies. Ample anecdotal and empirical evidence shows that foreign 
institutional investors, especially those from common-law countries, play a more active 
governance role than their domestic peers. For example, The Wall Street Journal reported that in 
Japan, in 2007, foreign investors such as the U.S. fund Steel Partners and the U.K. fund TCI 
submitted a record number of shareholder proposals and initiated engagement with the 
management, with the aim of improving corporate governance and returning value to shareholders. 
Although there was pressure from Japanese institutional investors as well, they were not viewed 
“as threatening in the way that foreign funds are.”3 Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Iliev, Lins, Miller, 
and Roth (2015) provide empirical evidence and exemplary cases in which foreign institutional 
investors influence governance outcomes via channels such as voting and proxy fights.  
Four inherent characteristics of foreign institutional investors explain their proclivity 
toward governance activism. First, compared to domestic peers, foreign institutional investors are 
less likely to have business dealings with local investee firms and therefore are more independent 
monitors of the management (Gillan and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011). Second, foreign 
institutional investors are less prone to local political pressure and therefore more resistant to non-
shareholder value maximizing decisions by managers (Huang and Zhu 2015; Tsang et al. 2016). 
Third, compared to domestic peers, foreign institutional investors have a deeper understanding of 
a broader set of governance tools due to their global investment experience, and that global 
knowledge and experience place them in a better position to prod firms to adopt best governance 
practices (Aggarwal et al. 2011). Fourth, because of their sizable and expanding presence in the 
                                                            
3 The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2007, “Signs of Hope for Japan’s Activists,” by Sebastian 
Moffett. 
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global capital market, institutional investors are under increasing pressure from various regulators 
and policy makers to play a more active governance role in their foreign investee companies.4  
Compared to domestic peers, foreign institutional investors are better able to deploy 
superior monitoring technologies because they have access to the global talent pool and possess 
the latest communication and analytical tools (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000). We argue that this 
technological advantage allows foreign institutional investors to perform the governance function 
more effectively and efficiently for three reasons. First, superior technology reduces the very 
transaction costs that distance engenders. For example, new technologies such as e-conferencing 
and e-proxy voting permit long-distance investors to more efficiently participate in shareholder 
meetings and exercise voting rights. Second, superior technology enables foreign institutional 
investors to take advantage of economies of scale, e.g., analyzing common governance issues 
more efficiently and accurately (Black and Coffee 1994). Third, superior technology lowers the 
costs of coordination among shareholders. Prior studies (e.g., Black and Coffee 1994; Gillan and 
Starks 2003) show that coordinated activism is more effective than activist campaigns waged by a 
single investor.  
Particularly relevant to our study are Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. 
(2011).5 Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that firm value is more positively associated with foreign, 
                                                            
4 In recent years, many countries, including the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Turkey, 
and South Africa to name a few, have issued stewardship codes that aim to encourage a more 
active governance role by institutional investors in global equity markets. 
5  In a contemporaneous working paper, Lel (2015) finds that foreign, but not domestic, 
institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management. To the extent that Lel’s 
sample is dominated by emerging countries, his finding is consistent with the global investor 
hypothesis. Emerging countries comprise 68% of Lel’s sample, compared to 24% in this study. 
Some of Lel’s results are in contrast to the existing literature; Lel finds that total institutional 
ownership increases earnings management; Lel also finds that ownership by domestic institutional 
investors increases earnings management in common-law countries; see Section 4.1 in this paper 
for a brief summary of the existing literature on the relation between institutional investors and 
earnings management. Lel uses three earnings management measures (EM1, EM2, and EM3) and 
uses the principal component analysis to extract an aggregate earnings management measure (EM-
Agg). For EM1, Lel finds that foreign institutional ownership significantly lowers earnings 
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rather than domestic, institutional ownership. Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that foreign, but not 
domestic, institutional investors affect a wide range of corporate governance attributes. Based on 
the prior literature, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2 (Global Investor Hypothesis): Because of their proclivity toward activism and 
ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies, foreign institutional investors have a 
comparative advantage over their domestic peers in constraining earnings management.  
The argument of proclivity toward activism is built upon the premise that foreign institutional 
investors have a greater incentive and willingness to monitor than their domestic peers. This 
inclination to monitor should be stronger in an environment of higher agency costs or weaker 
governance controls (Linck et al. 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011). Therefore, we propose the 
following corollary of H2:  
H2.a: The comparative advantage of foreign institutional investors over their domestic 
peers in curbing earnings management is larger when agency problems are more severe 
or governance controls are weaker. 
As superior monitoring technology is the other key driver behind the comparative monitoring 
advantage of foreign institutional investors (Miletkov, Poulsen, and Wintoki, 2016), we propose 
the following corollary of H2:  
H2.b: The comparative advantage of foreign institutional investors over their domestic 
peers in curbing earnings management is larger when the gap in monitoring technology 
between them and their domestic peers is bigger. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample collection  
Institutional ownership comes from FactSet, which is a leading provider of a broad 
spectrum of global data including financial, price, and governance data (http://www.factset.com/). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
management, while domestic institutional ownership significantly increases it. For EM2, Lel finds 
that foreign institutional ownership significantly increases earnings management, while domestic 
institutional ownership is insignificant. For EM3, Lel finds domestic, but not foreign, institutional 
ownership reduces earnings management.  For EM-Agg, Lel finds that foreign, but not domestic, 
institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management.  
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We follow Ferreira and Matos (2008) in extracting the institutional ownership data from FactSet. 
We include in the sample all non-U.S. and non-financial firms. We collect accounting and stock 
price data from the COMPUSTAT Global database. Countries with less than 100 firm-year 
observations are excluded from the sample (Huang, 2000). After meeting the necessary data 
requirements, the final sample is an unbalanced panel of 66,286 firm-year observations from 2001 
to 2013, including 11,403 firms, 2,724 institutional investors, and 29 countries.  
 
3.2. Institutional ownership variables  
We use three main variables to measure institutional stockholdings: total, domestic, and 
foreign institutional ownership. Following Ferreira and Matos (2008), total institutional ownership 
(TOTAL) is defined as the percent of stockholdings by all institutional investors; domestic 
institutional ownership (DOMESTIC) is the percent of stockholdings by all institutional investors 
domiciled in the same country in which the stock is issued; foreign institutional ownership 
(FOREIGN) is defined as the percent of stockholdings by all institutional investors domiciled in a 
country different from the country in which the stock is issued. Following Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), we calculate institutional ownership at the end of a calendar 
year and set the value to zero if a stock is not held by any institution in the FactSet database.  
 
3.3. Earnings management measures 
Following the literature, we construct three measures of earnings management: (1) 
performance-adjusted accruals (EM1) based on the method used in Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley 
(2011) and Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003); (2) accruals (EM2) based on the piecewise-
linear model developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006) that incorporates asymmetrically timely 
recognition of economic gains and losses; and (3) the magnitude of accruals (EM3) used in Leuz, 
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Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) that measures the extent to which 
insiders exercise discretion in reporting earnings.  
For a more tractable presentation of our regression results, we follow the literature (Leuz, 
et al. 2003; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012) and construct a composite measure of earnings 
management (Agg. EM) by combining EM1, EM2, and EM3 using a principal component analysis. 
Agg. EM is our main variable to capture the extent of earnings management. Larger values of Agg. 
EM represent greater earnings management.  
As one of our objectives is to ascertain whether the results of Ayers et al. (2011) and 
Chhaochharia et al. (2012) can be extended to an international setting, we follow their construction 
of earnings management proxies by using unsigned, accruals-based measures. However, for 
robustness, we also use alternative measures, including signed EM1, signed EM2, signed EM3, a 
signed composite measure (Signed Agg. EM), a small positive earnings dummy (EM_Small), and a 
measure of persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. Similar to Agg. EM, we 
construct Signed Agg. EM by combining signed EM1, signed EM2, and signed EM3 using a 
principal component analysis. Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Barth, Landsman, 
and Lang (2008), we set EM_Small to one if after-tax earnings over assets fall within the range of 
[0.000, 0.015], or zero otherwise. To estimate the persistence of transitory loss components in 
earnings, we use Basu’s (1997) serial dependence model as modified by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005). Less persistence in negative earnings changes indicates higher earnings quality. Our main 
results hold using these alternative measures of earnings management. We report the regression 
results from estimating the baseline regression using unsigned EM1, unsigned EM2, unsigned 
EM3, Signed Agg. EM, and EM_small as the dependent variable in Appendix II. For ease of 
presentation, we do not report the regression results using the measure based on the Basu (1997) 
model; those results are available in the Internet Appendix. We winsorize all the measures of 
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earnings management at the 1st and the 99th percentile to alleviate the concern of extreme outliers. 
Appendix I provides definitions of all variables. 
 
3.4. Univariate statistics  
Table 1 lists alphabetically the 29 countries in our sample. Similarly to Aggarwal et al. 
(2011), Japan has the largest number of firm-year observations in the sample (18,204 firm years or 
27.5% of the sample), whereas Ireland has the smallest number of firm-year observations (196 
firm years or 0.3% of the sample). In Table 1, we also report by country the mean values of the 
aggregate earnings management measure (Agg. EM) and ownership by domestic (DOMESTIC) 
and foreign (FOREIGN) institutional investors. Greece (Canada) has the highest (lowest) level of 
earnings management and ranks 27th (3rd) in the level of domestic institutional ownership and 17th 
(12th) in the level of foreign institutional ownership. In addition, Table 1 reports the legal origin 
and the stage of the economic development of the sample countries. Following the literature, we 
use La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)’s classification of legal origin. Our 
sample comprises 11 common-law countries and 18 civil-law countries. The classification of 
economic development is based on the MSCI Developed and Emerging Markets Indices that we 
obtain from Bloomberg. Our sample includes seven emerging countries and 22 developed 
countries.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables. The mean of the aggregate 
earnings management measure (Agg. EM) is 0.496. The average firm has 9.4 percent in total 
institutional holdings, 4.9 percent in domestic institutional holdings, and 4.6 percent in foreign 
institutional holdings. Each variable exhibits considerable variation with the standard deviation 
being 11.2 percent, 8.0 percent, and 6.9 percent, respectively. The descriptive statistics of our 
institutional ownership variables are in line with those reported in Ferreira and Matos (2008). For 
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example, they report a mean percent of 7.4, 3.8, and 3.6 for total, domestic, and foreign 
institutional stockholdings with a standard deviation of 12.6, 8.7, and 7.9 percent, respectively. 
Table 3 reports the correlations between the main variables of interest. The composite 
earnings measurement measure (Agg. EM) is significantly and negatively related to all three 
measures of institutional ownership—total institutional ownership (TOTAL), domestic institutional 
ownership (DOMESTIC), and foreign institutional ownership (FOREIGN). As expected, TOTAL is 
highly correlated with DOMESTIC (ρ=0.800) and FOREIGN (ρ=0.716). Notably, the correlation 
coefficient between DOMESTIC and FOREIGN is small (ρ=0.158). The correlation coefficient 
between firm size (SIZE) and the natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering a firm 
(ANALYST) is the only other coefficient with a value greater than 0.5 in absolute terms.  
4. Drivers behind monitoring effectiveness 
4.1. Baseline results 
To test H1 and H2, we estimate the following baseline model: 
|EMijkt| = α + γINSTIT_OWNijkt-1 + βXijkt-1 + dt + dj + dk + εijkt,                    …(1) 
where EM is the aggregate earnings management measure (Agg. EM); INSTIT_OWN denotes the 
institutional ownership measures (TOTAL, DOMESTIC, and FOREIGN) for firm i; α is the 
intercept. X is a vector of firm and country controls; dt denotes year dummies; dj denotes industry 
fixed effects at the level of two-digit SIC codes; dk denotes country fixed effects; and ε is the error 
term. Each specification is estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method with robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering.  
The hometown advantage hypothesis (H1) predicts that the coefficient estimate of 
domestic institutional ownership (DOMESTIC) is significantly negative and the coefficient size is 
larger than that of foreign institutional ownership (FOREIGN). In contrast, the global investor 
hypothesis (H2) predicts that FOREIGN enters Eq. (1) with a significantly negative sign, and its 
coefficient size is larger than that of DOMESTIC. We use a two-tail test to examine whether the 
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coefficient estimates of DOMESTIC and FOREIGN are significantly different from each other 
because we view whether H1 or H2 dominates as an empirical question. When we test the 
corollaries of H1 and H2, we use a one-tail test because each corollary makes specific directional 
predictions.  
We examine the effect of total institutional ownership (TOTAL) to better engage the 
extant literature. The corporate governance literature has long argued that institutional investors 
play a prominent monitoring role because they have the economic incentive and knowledge 
sophistication to be effective monitors (Gillan 2006). Consistent with this argument, Mitra and 
Cready (2005), Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008; 2009) and Chhaochharia, Kumar, and 
Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) find a negative relation between total institutional ownership and earnings 
management.6 Therefore, we expect TOTAL to enter Eq. (1) with a significantly negative sign. 
We include in the baseline model a customary set of control variables by following the 
literature. For firm characteristics, we consider firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), growth 
opportunities (MTB and SALEGROWTH), financial leverage (LEV), volatility of sales 
(STDSALE), capital intensity (CAPITAL_INTENSITY), and analyst coverage (ANALYST) (see, 
e.g., Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003; Chung, Firth, and Kim 2002; Gopalan and 
Jayaraman 2012). We also control for macroeconomic factors that potentially influence firm 
earnings, including a country’s accounting standards (ACC_STANDARD), per capita GDP growth 
(GDPGROWTH), and the annual rate of inflation (INFLATION) (Leuz et al. 2003; Gopalan and 
                                                            
6 We note that Mitra and Cready (2005), Cornett et al. (2008 and 2009) and Chhaochharia et al. 
(2012) all use U.S. data. Specifically, Mitra and Cready (2005) study 373 industrial firms listed on 
the NYSE from 1991 to 1998. Cornett et al. (2008) study S&P100 firms from 1994 to 2003. 
Cornett et al. (2009) study the 100 largest banks from 1994 to 2002. Chhaochharia et al. (2012) 
use the intersection of firms from Compustat and Thomson Reuters 13F from 1980 to 2007. 
Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) also find that institutional ownership reduces earnings management. 
They measure the monitoring by institutional investors using a dummy variable that equals one if 
institutional ownership for a firm is higher than the sample median in a given year.   
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Jayaraman 2012). Appendix I provides more details on the construction and data source of each 
variable.  
In untabulated analysis, we perform a diagnostic analysis for the potential 
multicollinearity problem in the baseline model. INFLATION has the largest value of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of 5.52, followed by GDPGROWTH (VIF=3.81) and ACC_STANDARD 
(VIF=3.17). The relatively high VIF values of the three proxies for country characteristics are 
likely due to the inclusion of country fixed effects in the baseline model. VIFs of the remaining 
independent variables are less than three, with VIF values of DOMESTIC and FOREIGN less than 
two. The rule of thumb is that VIFs exceeding ten are signs of serious multicollinearity (O’Brien, 
2007). 
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the regression results from estimating the baseline model. 
The coefficient estimate of DOMESTIC is -0.353, suggesting that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in domestic institutional ownership is associated with less Agg. EM by 3.53 percentage 
points. In contrast, FOREIGN enters the equation with a negative but insignificant sign. The Wald 
test rejects the null with a better than one percent significance that the coefficients of DOMESTIC 
and FOREIGN are equal. Thus, the results support the hometown advantage hypothesis, but not 
the global investor hypothesis. In addition, the economic impact of DOMESTIC is meaningful 
when compared to other control variables. For example, an increase of 10 percentage points in 
ROA is associated with a 6.21 percentage-point decrease in Agg. EM. (the mean value and 
standard deviation of ROA are 2.3% and 11.4% respectively). The coefficient estimates of the 
control variables generally carry the predicted signs and are in line with the existing literature. For 
example, consistent with Klein (2002) and Chaney et al. (2011), we find that small firms are more 
likely than large firms to engage in opportunistic financial reporting.  
To provide greater details for the baseline model, column (2) of Table 4 reports the 
estimation results when TOTAL is the only independent variable included in the regression, while 
18 
 
column (3) reports the estimation results when DOMESTIC and FOREIGN are the only 
independent variables included in the regression. Column (4) reports the benchmark regression 
when only the control variables are included in the regression. Consistent with column (1) and 
prior studies (Cornett et al. 2008 and 2009; Chhaochharia et al. 2012), TOTAL is significantly and 
negatively related to Agg. EM in columns (2) and (5).  
Our model specification performs well when compared to the literature. Our baseline 
model explains 0.108 of the variation in Agg. EM. For comparison, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) 
report an adjusted R-squared of 0.099 when relating institutional ownership to absolute value of 
discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones model. Ayers et al. (2011) report an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.076 when relating the presence of local and distant institutional investors 
to absolute value of abnormal accruals. Cornett et al. (2008) report a higher adjusted R-squared 
(0.418) likely because they use a much more homogenous group of firms than either this paper or 
Chhaochharia et al. (2012) and Ayers et al. (2011). Cornett et al. (2008) study S&P100, which are 
the largest U.S. firms by market capitalization.  
 
Endogeneity checks 
An alternative explanation for the results in Table 4 is that domestic institutional 
investors are more skilled than foreign counterparts at identifying local firms with higher quality 
financial statements. In other words, our results arise not from domestic institutions being more 
effective monitors but from them being better stock pickers. It is worth noting that in the latter 
case, domestic institutions still enjoy local information advantages over foreign ones, which is a 
key ingredient for monitoring effectiveness if an investor chooses to monitor. It is also possible 
that foreign institutions systematically prefer certain types of firms and those firms happen to 
more opportunistically report earnings. In short, endogeneity may influence our results. To address 
this concern, we conduct four robustness checks: 1) a two-stage least-squares instrumental 
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variable (2SLS-IV) analysis; 2) a reverse casualty analysis; 3) the dynamic panel generalized-
method-of-moments (GMM) analysis; and 4) a propensity-score-matching (PSM) analysis. Our 
results remain qualitatively similar in these robustness checks. To conserve space, we do not 
report the results in the paper, but make them available in the Internet Appendix.  
 
Other robustness checks 
We perform additional tests for more robustness. The results are reported in Appendix 
III.  Column (1) reports the regression results when we estimate the baseline model replacing 
industry with firm fixed effects. Column (2) reports the estimation results of the baseline model 
when we replace firm-level clustering with country-level clustering. Column (3) reports the 
regression results when we estimate the baseline model using robust standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and two-way clustering by firm and year. As missing institutional ownership 
values are set to zero, we follow the literature (e.g., Ferreira and Matos 2008) and re-run the 
baseline model using only observations with non-missing institutional ownership to mitigate the 
concern that the missing data may influence our inference. The results are reported in column (4). 
As Table 1 shows, Japan has a much larger number of firm-year observations than other countries. 
To alleviate the concern that one country may drive our results, similar to DeFond, Hung, and 
Trezevant (2007), we re-run the baseline model after excluding Japan from the sample. The results 
are reported in column (5). Although both the correlation matrix and the VIF analysis indicate that 
the multicollinearity problem is not a serious concern for this study, for additional robustness, we 
re-run the baseline model after dropping the domestic and foreign institutional ownership variables 
and including in their place the ratio of domestic institutional ownership over foreign institutional 
ownership. The results are reported in column (6). Column (7) reports the estimation results of the 
baseline model when we exclude the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (i.e., sample years from 2007 to 
2009), as managers’ incentives to manage earnings and institutions’ willingness to invest may 
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have been different in the crisis years. Column (8) reports the regression results when we add to 
the baseline model a cross-listing dummy (CROSS_LISTING), which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange, including the cross-listing of common 
shares, global depository receipts (GDRs), and American depository receipts (ADRs). Last, we 
control for the governance characteristics of investee firms by adding to the baseline model the G-
index. The G-index is a composite measure of 41 firm-level governance attributes and comes from 
Aggarwal et al. (2011). The results are reported in column (9). We lose a substantial number of 
observations when we impose the data requirement of G-index, because the sample of Aggarwal et 
al. (2011) covers large firms in developed countries from 2004 to 2008, while our sample consists 
of a larger number of smaller firms, includes developing countries, and spans 2001 to 2013. Our 
results hold in each of these robustness checks.  
 
4.2. Additional evidence for the role of information asymmetry  
H1.a predicts that the “Hometown Advantage” is more pronounced when information 
asymmetry is higher. To test H1.a, we partition the sample into two groups based on information 
acquisition and processing costs at the firm and country levels. H1.a predicts that the coefficient 
difference between DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGNt-1 is more negative in the subgroup with high 
levels of information costs than the coefficient difference in the subgroup with low levels of 
information costs. Given this specific directional prediction, we use a one-tail test to test H1.a. 
To proxy for firm-level information acquisition and processing costs, we use median 
values of firm size and analyst coverage to separate firms into the subgroups of high and low 
levels of information costs. Due to more extensive media coverage and more intensive market 
scrutiny, a larger volume of information is produced for large firms and firms with more analyst 
coverage. Consequently, we expect investors in small firms and firms with shallow analyst 
coverage to face a higher level of information acquisition and processing costs. Panel A of Table 5 
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reports regression results when we estimate the baseline model separately for the subgroups. 
Consistent with H1.a, the coefficient difference between DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGNt-1 is 
significantly more negative when the investee firms are smaller (p-value=0.02) or when fewer 
analysts follow the investee firms (p-value=0.03). Consistent with Table 4 and the hometown 
advantage hypothesis, in each subgroup, DOMESTICt-1 is significantly and negatively related to 
earnings management, while FOREIGNt-1 is consistently insignificant; further, in the subgroups of 
high information acquisition and processing costs, the coefficient estimates of DOMESTICt-1 and 
FOREIGNt-1 are statistically different from each other. In untabulated analysis, we follow the 
literature (e.g., Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu 2009) and use two 
alternative proxies to measure whether a firm faces a higher level of information acquisition and 
processing costs, namely whether a firm engages one of the Big-4 auditors (Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, and PwC) or has greater growth opportunities (defined as the market-to-book ratio 
being above median). We find qualitatively similar results: consistent with H1.a, the coefficient 
difference between DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGNt-1 is significantly more negative when an 
investee firm does not engage a Big-4 auditor (p-value=0.04) or has more growth opportunities (p-
value=0.02). Additionally, DOMESTICt-1 is always significantly negative, while FOREIGNt-1 is 
always insignificant. 
To proxy for country-level information acquisition and processing costs, we use 
Prevalence of Insider Trading and Disclosure Quality from La Porta et al. (2006). Prevalence of 
Insider Trading is built upon responses from a survey that asks executives if “insider trading in 
your country’s stock markets is (1=pervasive, 7=extremely rare).” Disclosure Quality is an index 
constructed based on attorneys’ answers to questions regarding: 1) prospectus; 2) compensation; 
3) shareholders; 4) inside ownership; 5) contracts irregular; and 6) transactions. Similarly to the 
firm-level analysis, we partition the sample based on median values of Prevalence of Insider 
Trading and Disclosure Quality. Consistent with H1.a, the comparative monitoring advantage of 
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domestic institutional investors over their foreign peers is significantly larger when the host 
country has more prevalent insider trading (p-value=0.03) or poorer disclosure quality (p-
value=0.04). Consistent with H1 and earlier firm-level results, DOMESTICt-1 enters all the 
regressions with a significantly negative sign, while FOREIGNt-1 is always insignificant. 
 
4.3. Proximity in region, accounting standards, and culture  
H1.b predicts that as foreign institutional investors gain proximity to monitoring 
information, they close the gap in monitoring effectiveness between themselves and domestic 
counterparts. To test H1.b, we explore three dimensions of proximity—whether a foreign 
institutional investor and its investee firm: 1) are located in the same geographical region, 2) use 
similar accounting standards, or 3) share similar cultural traits. H1.b predicts that the coefficient 
difference between DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGNt-1 is more negative than the coefficient 
difference between DOMESTICt-1 and the ownership variables for foreign institutional investors 
with one of those traits. Table 6 reports the regression results. For easy exposition, we report in 
Table 6 column (1) the estimation results of the baseline model that was initially reported in Table 
4 column (1).  
For the test of proximity in geographical region, we construct the variable of 
FOREIGN_REGIONt-1, which is the ownership by foreign institutional investors domiciled in the 
same subregion as the investee firm based on the classification of FactSet. There are 19 subregions 
in our sample: eastern, middle, northern, southern, and western Africa; central, south, and northern 
America; central, eastern, southern, south-eastern, and western Asia; eastern, northern, southern, 
and western Europe; the Caribbean; and Oceania. Column (2) reports the estimation results, where 
we use the baseline model to relate the extent of earnings management (Agg. EM) to 
FOREIGN_REGIONt-1. Consistent with H1.b, the coefficient difference between DOMESTICt-1 
and FOREIGNt-1 is significantly more negative than the coefficient difference between 
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DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGN_REGIONt-1 (p-value=0.01). Notably, FOREIGN_REGIONt-1 carries 
a negative coefficient of a larger magnitude (-6.445) than does DOMESTICt-1 (-0.346); the 
coefficient equality test rejects the null (DOMESTICt-1=FOREIGN_REGIONt-1) with 0.08 
significance. Collectively, column (2) results suggest that coming from the same geographical 
region enables foreign institutional investors to overcome the hometown advantage of domestic 
counterparts, leading them to be more effective than their domestic peers in mitigating earnings 
management.  
For the test of proximity in accounting standards, we construct the variable of 
FOREIGN_ACTGt-1, which is the ownership by foreign institutional investors whose home 
country uses accounting standards comparable to the host country. We obtain the data on the 
accounting standards of each country from Compustat Global. Column (3) reports the estimation 
results when we replace FOREIGNt-1 with FOREIGN_ACTGt-1 in the baseline model. Consistent 
with H1.b, DOMESTICt-1 minus FOREIGNt-1 is significantly more negative than DOMESTICt-1 
minus FOREIGN_ACTGt-1 (p-value=0.07). Further, FOREIGN_ACTGt-1 is significantly and 
negatively related to Agg. EM and the F-test fails to reject the null of DOMESTICt-
1=FOREIGN_ACTGt-1, suggesting that by shrinking the “distance” in familiarity with the host 
country’s financial reporting practices, foreign institutional investors can become as effective as 
domestic counterparts in mitigating opportunistic financial reporting. Our results complement the 
recent evidence that the global harmonization of financial statements reduces information 
acquisition and processing costs, leading to greater foreign investment (DeFond, Hu, Huang, and 
Li 2011; Yu and Wahid 2014).  
For the test of proximity in culture, we construct the variable of FOREIGN_CULTUREt-1, 
which is the ownership by foreign institutional investors whose home country is similar in cultural 
tightness as the host country. The concept of cultural tightness was first introduced by Pelto 
(1968) and Triandis (1989) and later formalized by Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver (2006) and Gelfand 
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et al. (2011). The theory of cultural tightness posits that cultural tightness relates to preferred ways 
of gathering, processing, and evaluating information when solving problems (Gelfand et al. 2006 
and 2011). If an investor is similar to the investee firm in gathering, processing, and evaluating 
information, it is reasonable to assume that the investor faces lower costs in acquiring and 
processing monitoring information with regard to that firm. We obtain the data on a country’s 
cultural tightness from Gelfand et al. (2011). We rank countries into three groups based on their 
cultural tightness scores, and classify two countries as similar in cultural tightness if they are in the 
same tercile. Column (4) reports the regression results when we replace FOREIGNt-1 with 
FOREIGN_CULTUREt-1 in the baseline model. Consistent with H1.b, DOMESTICt-1 minus 
FOREIGNt-1 is significantly more negative than DOMESTICt-1 minus FOREIGN_CULTUREt-1 (p-
value=0.03). In addition, FOREIGN_CULTUREt-1 is significantly and negatively related to Agg. 
EM and the F-test fails to reject the null of DOMESTICt-1=FOREIGN_CULTUREt-1, suggesting 
that foreign institutions with similar cultural traits as investee firms can be as effective as domestic 
institutions in deterring earnings management.  
Although the preceding analysis is useful in helping us gain a deeper understanding of 
how proximity to monitoring information drives the monitoring effectiveness of institutional 
investors in an international setting, we acknowledge that the exploration is far from complete. As 
the existing literature notes, some of the best monitoring outcomes result from “behind-the-scenes 
engagement” (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998; Bauer, Clark, and Viehs 2013). While we 
can conjecture that domestic institutional investors are likely to have a comparative monitoring 
advantage over foreign counterparts in “behind-the-scenes engagement,” we lack the data to 
empirically test this conjecture. We also lack the data to explore other factors that potentially drive 
the comparative monitoring advantages of domestic and foreign institutional investors. For 
example, Lerner (1995) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) argue that transportation costs influence 
the number of on-site visits that can be made by monitors. Despite the limitations, the evidence in 
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this section is instructive in illustrating the drivers behind the monitoring effective of global 
institutional investors, a subject that is in need of research especially given the tremendous growth 
of financial assets under their management in recent years.7 
 
4.4. Proclivity toward activism 
H2.a predicts that the comparative advantage of foreign institutional investors in curbing 
earnings management is larger when agency problems are more severe or governance controls are 
weaker. To test H2.a, we conduct two cross-sectional investigations—one based on the extent of 
agency conflicts at investee firms and the other based on the strength of a host country’s 
governance controls. 
In the first test, we separate the sample into two groups based on the median value of a 
firm’s free cash flow (Jensen 1986; Lehn and Poulsen 1989). H2.a predicts that the coefficient 
difference between DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGNt-1 is more negative for investee firms with low 
levels of free cash flow than that difference for firms with high levels of free cash flow. In other 
words, H2.a predicts that because of their proclivity toward activism, foreign institutional 
investors gain monitoring effectiveness relative to their domestic peers in firms with greater 
agency conflicts as measured by free cash flow. As Table 7 panel A shows, we find the following 
supporting evidence for H2.a. First, DOMESTICt-1 minus FOREIGNt-1 is significantly more 
negative for firms with low, rather than high, levels of free cash flow (p-value=0.03), which is 
consistent with the prediction of H2.a that the comparative advantage of foreign institutions over 
                                                            
7 It is currently infeasible to gather private-engagement data for a large sample study like ours. For 
example, Carleton et al. (1998) study private negations by a large U.S. pension fund—TIAA-
CREF. Bauer et al. (2013) use the proprietary data of one large (anonymous) U.K. institution. 
Nonetheless, we did explore two additional dimensions of proximity to information: whether a 
foreign institutional investor and its investee speak the same language or have the same legal 
origin as classified in La Porta et al. (1998). As we do not find that these proximity traits impact 
the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutional investors, we do not report the regression 
results to conserve space. 
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domestic institutions in curbing earnings management is larger in environments of high, rather 
than low, agency conflicts. Second, FOREIGNt-1 is significantly negative (coefficient=-0.155) in 
the regression of High Free Cash Flow, but is insignificant (coefficient=0.083) in the regression of 
Low Free Cash Flow, suggesting again in line with H2.a that the monitoring effect of foreign 
institutional investors is more pronounced in environments of high, but not low, agency conflicts. 
Third, a coefficient equality test fails to reject the null of DOMESTICt-1=FOREIGNt-1 for firms 
with high levels of free cash flow, but rejects the null for firms with low levels of free cash flow 
with 0.02 significance, suggesting, once again consistent with H2.a, that when agency costs are 
high, their comparative advantage in proclivity toward activism enables foreign institutional 
investors to overcome the proximity dis-advantage and become as effective as their domestic peers 
in restraining earnings management. 
To more rigorously test H2.a, we deploy a finer classification of foreign versus domestic 
institutional investors—independent foreign (FOREIGN_INDEPt-1) versus independent domestic 
(DOMESTIC_INDEPt-1) institutional investors. Results are reported in Table 7 columns (2) and 
(4). The literature (e.g., Linck et al 2008) establishes that independent monitors are more effective 
monitors. Therefore, a natural extension of H2.a is that independent foreign institutional investors 
have a more negative impact on earnings management. Following the literature (e.g., Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith 1988; Ferreira and Matos 2008), we classify mutual funds and independent 
investment advisors as independent institutional investors. The results become stronger when we 
use this finer classification: the coefficient difference-in-difference test (i.e., DOMESTIC_INDEPt-
1 minus FOREIGN_INDEPt-1 across firms with low versus high levels of free cash flow) becomes 
more significant with 0.01 significance and the coefficient estimates of DOMESTIC_INDEPt-1 and 
FOREIGN_INDEPt-1 are negative and of larger magnitudes than those of DOMESTICt-1 and 
FOREIGNt-1, respectively. To summarize, Table 7 panel A offers strong evidence in support of 
H2.a. 
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In the second test, we separate the sample into two groups based on the host country’s 
legal origin. The law and finance literature shows that corporate governance is stronger in 
common-law countries as opposed to civil-law countries (La Porta et al. 1998; Aggarwal et al. 
2011). H2.a predicts that the coefficient difference between DOMESTICt-1 and FOREIGNt-1 is 
more negative in common-law countries than in civil-law countries. As Table 7 panel B shows, we 
do not find supporting evidence: the p-value is 0.44 for the one-tailed F-test that DOMESTICt-1 
minus FOREIGNt-1 is more negative in the common-law regression than in the civil-law 
regression. 
To provide a sharper test, we further classify foreign institutional investors into two 
groups—those from common-law countries (FOREIGN_COMt-1) and those from civil-law 
countries (FOREIGN_CIVt-1). Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that institutional investors from 
common-law countries are more effective monitors than those from civil-law countries. Under this 
sharper contrast, three patterns emerge that are consistent with H2.a. First, of the four varying 
contracting conditions (i.e., the four outcomes based on the 2X2 matrix of a host country’s legal 
origin vis-à-vis an institution’s legal origin), we find the strongest result for FOREIGN_COMt-1 in 
civil-law countries; specifically, only FOREIGN_COMt-1 enters the regression with a significantly 
negative sign (t-value=-1.67). Second, one-tailed F-tests of whether FOREIGN_COMt-1 and 
FOREIGN_CIVt-1 are more negative in civil-law countries than in common-law countries (i.e., 
COM(FOREIGN_COMt-1) > CIV(FOREIGN_COMt-1) and COM(FOREIGN_CIVt-1) > 
CIV(FOREIGN_CIVt-1), respectively) yield a p-value of 0.06 and 0.05, respectively, suggesting 
that for both types of foreign institutions, they are more effective at monitoring opportunistic 
financial reporting in civil-law countries than in common-law countries, which is consistent with 
H2.a in that an increase in the comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors 
correlates positively with their monitoring effectiveness. Third, when we design a test that 
highlights the most extreme comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors, 
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we find the strongest result for their being effective at deterring earnings management—the one-
tailed F-test for COM(DOMESTICt-1 – FOREIGN_CIVt-1) < CIV(DOMESTICt-1 – 
FOREIGN_COMt-1) yields a p-value of 0.04.8 
Taken together, the overall results in Table 7 panel B are consistent with H2.a in that the 
comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors, particularly those from 
common-law countries, works to a greater effect in civil-law countries.  
 
4.5. Superior monitoring technology 
H2.b predicts that the comparative advantage of foreign institutional investors in curbing 
earnings management is larger when the gap in monitoring technology between them and their 
domestic peers is bigger. To test H2.b, we separate the sample into two groups—emerging 
countries (less sophisticated monitoring technology) and developed countries (more advanced 
monitoring technology)—based on the economic development of the host country. Again for a 
sharper test, we discriminate foreign institutional investors from developed countries 
(FOREIGN_DEVELOPt-1) against those from emerging countries (FOREIGN_EMERGt-1). Table 8 
gives the regression results.  
Similar to Table 7 panel B, when we use a coarse classification to measure the 
comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors, we fail to find supporting 
evidence for H2.b: the p-value is 0.20 for the one-tailed F-test that DOMESTICt-1 minus 
FOREIGNt-1 is more negative in developed countries than in emerging countries, which is 
                                                            
8 FOREIGN_CIVt-1 is insignificant in civil-law countries but is significantly positive in common-
law countries. Although the positive coefficient of FOREIGN_CIVt-1 is counterintuitive, it is 
consistent with the idea that these investors do not specialize in monitoring and face the largest 
monitoring dis-advantage in our 2X2 design (i.e., the legal origin of investee firms vis-à-vis the 
legal origin of institutional investors). The positive coefficient of FOREIGN_CIVt-1 is also 
consistent with the prevailing empirical findings that a firm tends to engage in opportunistic, or 
even value-destroying, activities when more of its stocks are owned by investors who do not 
specialize in monitoring (Bushee 1998; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007). 
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inconsistent with H2.b that foreign institutions gain in monitoring effectiveness relative to 
domestic institutions when their comparative advantage in monitoring technologies over their 
domestic peers’ widens. However, when we design tests that more sharply highlight the 
comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors, we find supporting evidence 
for H2.b. Specifically, consistent with H2.b, DOMESTICt-1 minus FOREIGN_EMERGt-1 is 
significantly more negative in developed countries than DOMESTICt-1 minus 
FOREIGN_DEVELOPt-1 in emerging countries (p-value=0.02). Consistent with H2.b, while 
FOREIGNt-1 is insignificant in developed countries, it is negatively and significantly related to 
earnings management in emerging countries and this negative relation is driven primarily by 
foreign institutional investors from developed countries. Whereas the coefficient of DOMESTICt-1 
is significantly more negative than FOREIGNt-1 with a p-value of 0.01 in the regression of 
development countries, these two coefficients are statistically indistinguishable in the regression 
of emerging countries (p-value=0.15), which lends additional support for H2.b and suggests that 
under this contracting condition, foreign institutions’ comparative advantage in superior 
monitoring technology counterbalances their proximity dis-advantage, allowing them to be as 
effective monitors as domestic counterparts. The one-tailed F-test for 
DEVELOP(FOREIGN_DEVELOPt-1) > EMERG(FOREIGN_DEVELOPt-1) yields a p-value of 
0.07, but is insignificant (p-value=0.18)  for DEVELOP(FOREIGN_EMERGt-1) > 
EMERG(FOREIGN_EMERGt-1), underscoring again the important role that technological 
superiority plays in driving monitoring effectiveness. 
To summarize, the overall results in Table 8 are consistent with H2.b in that the 
comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors, particularly those from 
developed countries, works to a greater effect in emerging countries where the gap in monitoring 
technology between foreign and domestic institutional investors is larger. The fact that we find 
evidence consistent with H2.b, as is the case with H2.a, only after deploying more accurate 
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proxies for the comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutional investors in subsamples 
is consistent with the strong evidence found for the full sample. We find for the full sample that 
consistent with H1, because of proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutional 
investors are more effective than their foreign counterparts in constraining earnings management. 
 
5. Conclusion 
One key trend in the global capital market is the growth of financial assets under the 
management of institutional investors. Not surprisingly, researchers have taken a keen interest in 
recent years in analyzing the governance role that institutional investors play in their investee 
firms around the globe. This paper contributes to this growing literature by studying the economic 
drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors. Drawing from several 
streams of literature, we identify three distinct drivers and propose two competing hypotheses to 
test their relative importance. Specifically, the hometown advantage hypothesis predicts that 
because of their proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutional investors have a 
comparative advantage over their foreign counterparts in curbing earnings management, whereas 
the global investor hypothesis predicts that because of their proclivity toward activism and ability 
to deploy superior monitoring technologies, foreign institutional investors have a comparative 
advantage over their domestic peers in constraining earnings management. 
We find that in aggregate, domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is negatively 
related to the extent of earnings management, consistent with the hometown advantage hypothesis. 
Additionally, domestic institutional ownership becomes more negatively linked to earnings 
management relative to foreign institutional ownership when proximity to information becomes 
more important as measured by information asymmetry around the investee firms. As foreign 
institutional investors become more familiar with the host country’s accounting practices and 
culture (i.e., shrinking the proximity advantage enjoyed by domestic counterparts), they become as 
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effective as domestic institutional investors in constraining earnings management. Notably, once 
we isolate conditions under which the comparative monitoring advantage of foreign institutions 
likely work to a greater effect, we also find evidence consistent with the global investor 
hypothesis: ownership by foreign institutional investors located in the same geographic region as 
the investee firms is more negatively related to earnings management than domestic institutional 
ownership; foreign institutional ownership is significantly and negatively related to earnings 
management in firms with higher, but not lower, levels of free cash flow; and ownership of 
foreign institutional investors from common-law countries (developed countries) is significantly 
and negatively related to earnings management in civil-law countries (emerging countries).  
To use the analogy of a horse race, this paper goes beyond conducting a horse race—
which type of institutional investors, domestic or foreign, is more effective in constraining 
earnings management. We analyze the characteristics of each horse and design different races to 
showcase the relative strengths of each horse. Therefore, our paper provides insight into the 
monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors and reconciles the seemingly conflicting 
evidence in the existing literature—namely the international extension of US-based evidence in 
Ayers et al (2011) and Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) appears to be in direct 
conflict with the international evidence in Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. (2011).  
This paper highlights future research areas. Corporate actions are myriad and varied. The 
argument of comparative monitoring advantage suggests that domestic institutional investors are 
likely to be more effective at some tasks but not others. By using earnings management, we likely 
select a type of corporate behavior that domestic, rather than foreign, institutional investors have 
the greater comparative advantage in inducing a desired outcome. Future research is needed to 
explore the comparative advantages of domestic and foreign institutional investors in performing 
other types of monitoring tasks to identify new drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of 
global institutional investors. A more complete understanding of this subject is needed to inform 
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better policies, especially considering the increasing pressure around the world on institutional 
investors to play a more active governance role in their foreign investee firms. 
More broadly, there are numerous governance mechanisms besides institutional investors 
(e.g., board of directors, compensation contracts, and stock analysts); each performs to various 
levels of effectiveness as a result of specific contracting conditions. A contemporaneous study by 
Miletkov et al. (2016) report that prior studies have produced conflicting evidence regarding the 
efficacy of foreign directors because these studies based their conclusion on a single or a few 
countries. In contrast, Miletkov et al. (2016) use a broad cross-section of countries and find that 
country-level characteristics (e.g., institutional quality and investor protection) influence the 
association between foreign directors and firm performance. Our paper and Miletkov et al. (2016) 
highlight the need for future research regarding the drivers behind the effectiveness of governance 
tools, particularly in international settings.  
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Appendix I: Variable definitions and data sources  
This table provides definitions for all variables used in the study and the corresponding data source 
which we use to build the variable. 
 
Variables Definitions Data Source  
Panel A: Dependent variables - earnings management  
EM1 
 
 
Absolute value of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, 
calculated as the total current accruals minus expected 
performance-adjusted accruals based on the method used in Chaney 
et al. (2011) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003). Total current accruals 
(ACC) is calculated as 
ACC it = (ΔCA it  – ΔCL it) – (ΔCash it – ΔSTD it + ΔDEP it) 
where    CA : Total current assets 
              CL : Total current liabilities 
           Cash : Cash and cash equivalents 
           STD  : Short-term debt included in current liabilities 
           DEP : Depreciation and amortization expenses  
Δ, i, t denotes one year change in a variable, firm i, calendar 
year t, respectively 
Compustat 
Global 
EM2 Absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated as ACC minus 
expected accruals estimated using the non-linear cash flow model 
developed in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
Compustat 
Global 
EM3 The magnitude of accruals, following (Leuz et al. 2003) 
EM3 = | ACC it / TA it-1 | / | CF it / TA it-1 |  
where    TA : Total assets 
             CF : Operating income minus accruals 
Compustat 
Global 
Agg. EM Composite measure of earnings management based on a principal 
component analysis of EM1, EM2 and EM3  
Compustat 
Global 
Signed Agg. EM Composite measure of earnings management based on a principal 
component analysis of signed EM1, EM2 and EM3 (e.g., Hribar 
and Nichols 2007) 
Compustat 
Global 
EM_SMALL Small positive earnings dummy, which equals one if after-tax 
earnings over assets fall within the range of [0.00, 0.015] 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008) 
Compustat 
Global 
 
Panel B: Independent variables of interest - institutional ownership 
TOTAL  Percent of stockholdings by all institutions at the end of a calendar 
year; set to zero if a stock is not held by any institution  
FactSet 
DOMESTIC Percent of stockholdings by all institutions domiciled in the same 
country in which the stock is issued at the end of a calendar year; set to 
zero if a stock is not held by any institution  
FactSet 
FOREIGN Percent of stockholdings by all institutions domiciled in a country 
different from the country in which the stock is issued at the end of a 
calendar year; set to zero if a stock is not held by any institution 
FactSet 
FOREIGN_REGION Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in the same 
geographical region as the firm in institutions’ portfolios (investee 
firm)  
FactSet 
FOREIGN_ACTG Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in countries 
that have adopted accounting standards similar to the host countries. 
We aggregate the ownership of foreign institutions whose country-level 
accounting standard is the same as the accounting standard (IFRS) 
adopted by the investee firm.   
Compustat 
Global 
FOREIGN_CULTURE Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions whose home country is 
similar in cultural tightness to the host country. Cultural tightness 
relates to preferred ways of gathering, processing, and evaluating 
information when solving problems (Gelfand et al. 2006 and 2011). 
Gelfand et al. 
(2011) 
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Countries are ranked into three groups based on their cultural tightness 
scores. We classify two countries as similar in cultural tightness if they 
are in the same tercile. 
DOMESTIC_INDEP Domestic institutional investors are classified as independent if they are 
mutual funds and independent investment advisors. 
FactSet 
FOREIGN_INDEP Foreign institutional investors are classified as independent if they are 
mutual funds and independent investment advisors. 
FactSet 
FOREIGN_COM Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in a country 
with common-law legal origin  
FactSet 
FOREIGN_CIV Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in a country 
with civil-law legal origin  
FactSet 
FOREIGN_DEVELOP Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in a 
developed country  
FactSet 
/Bloomberg 
FOREIGN_EMERG Percent of stockholdings by foreign institutions domiciled in an 
emerging country  
FactSet 
/Bloomberg 
 
Panel C: Other variables 
SIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets Compustat Global 
ROA Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets Compustat Global 
MTB Natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio Compustat Global 
SALEGROWTH Sales t / Sales t-1 – 1 Compustat Global 
LEV Long-term debt plus current debt in liabilities over total assets  Compustat Global 
STDSALE Standard deviation of (sales / total assets) from years t-5 to t-1  Compustat Global 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY Fixed assets divided by lagged total assets Compustat Global 
ANALYST Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm in a given 
year 
I/B/E/S 
ACC_STANDARD A dummy that equals one if the firm has adopted the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or US GAAP,  zero otherwise 
Compustat Global 
GDPGROWTH Annual growth rate in per capita GDP World Bank 
(WDI) 
INFLATION Annual rate of inflation World Bank 
(WDI) 
CROSS_LISTING Cross-listing dummy, which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a 
foreign exchange, including the cross-listing of common shares, GDRs, 
and ADRs. 
Factset 
G-INDEX Composite of 41 firm-level governance attributes Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) 
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Appendix II: Alternative measures of earnings management 
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on 
institutional ownership for non-U.S. firms from 2001 to 2013. Detailed variable definitions are 
given in Appendix I. Each regression includes a constant and year, industry (based on two-digit 
SIC codes), and country fixed effects (FE). Column of Pred. Sign provides expected directional 
relations between the dependent variable and the main independent variables of interest. We report 
in parentheses t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance level of less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
 Dep. Var. = Pred. EM1t EM2t EM3t   Signed Agg. EMt   EM_Small 
  Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
TOTAL t-1  - -0.043***  -0.027***  -0.385***   -0.058***   -3.543***  
   (-3.89)  (-3.68)  (-5.39)   (-5.72)   (-6.68)  
DOMESTIC t-1 -  -0.068***  -0.072***  -0.532***   -0.086***   -5.070*** 
    (-4.39)  (-7.75)  (-5.37)   (-5.21)   (-6.21) 
FOREIGN t-1 -  -0.021  0.027**  -0.224**   -0.046***   -2.634*** 
    (-1.20)  (2.43)  (-2.09)   (-3.08)   (-3.19) 
SIZE t-1  -0.002** -0.002** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.030*** -0.032***  -0.007*** -0.007***  0.123*** 0.117*** 
   (-2.17) (-2.33) (-11.54) (-12.38) (-5.66) (-5.95)  (-8.44) (-8.48)  (3.92) (3.68) 
ROA t-1  -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -1.078*** -1.073***  -0.007 -0.007  -2.466*** -2.436*** 
   (-5.38) (-5.32) (-11.31) (-11.13) (-15.64) (-15.57)  (-0.75) (-0.68)  (-14.85) (-14.65) 
MTB t-1  0.006** 0.006** 0.019*** 0.018*** -0.074*** -0.075***  -0.002 -0.002  -0.538*** -0.539*** 
   (2.24) (2.17) (10.52) (10.30) (-4.41) (-4.48)  (-0.64) (-0.68)  (-6.90) (-6.92) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** -0.005 -0.005  -0.003 -0.003  -0.199** -0.197** 
   (4.57) (4.58) (7.05) (7.06) (-0.26) (-0.26)  (-1.16) (-1.14)  (-2.33) (-2.31) 
LEV t-1  -0.008 -0.008 -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.436*** 0.441***  0.112*** 0.112***  -0.144 -0.133 
   (-1.09) (-1.01) (-4.12) (-3.69) (8.16) (8.24)  (15.59) (15.58)  (-0.66) (-0.61) 
STDSALE t-1  0.150*** 0.149*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.479*** 0.477***  0.077*** 0.077***  -0.012 -0.018 
   (16.75) (16.72) (13.01) (12.96) (9.64) (9.61)  (11.01) (10.97)  (-0.06) (-0.10) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITYt-1  -0.002 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.311*** -0.310***  -0.064*** -0.064***  -1.135*** -1.134*** 
   (-0.61) (-0.59) (-8.06) (-7.96) (-16.00) (-15.96)  (-23.40) (-23.39)  (-9.66) (-9.65) 
ANALYSTt-1  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.022*** -0.024***  0.000 0.000  -0.291*** -0.292*** 
   (-0.85) (-0.98) (0.84) (-0.05) (-3.93) (-4.13)  (0.01) (0.02)  (-7.57) (-7.60) 
ACC_STANDARDt-1  -0.006 -0.006 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.038* 0.040*  0.018*** 0.018***  0.079 0.082 
   (-1.57) (-1.52) (4.05) (4.29) (1.81) (1.89)  (5.76) (5.76)  (0.74) (0.77) 
GDPGROWTHt-1  -0.022 -0.020 -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.869** -0.858**  0.566*** 0.569***  -3.895** -3.830** 
   (-0.29) (-0.26) (-6.25) (-6.14) (-2.09) (-2.06)  (9.36) (9.40)  (-2.49) (-2.45) 
INFLATIONt-1  -0.215** -0.212** -0.052 -0.042 2.274*** 2.303***  0.177** 0.178**  -1.180 -1.040 
   (-2.10) (-2.06) (-1.02) (-0.83) (4.00) (4.05)  (2.11) (2.12)  (-0.47) (-0.42) 
CONSTANT, YEAR, 
INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
Number of observations 
 66,286 66,286 66,286 66,286 66,286 66,286   66,286 66,286   66,286 66,286 
R-squared 
 0.227 0.227 0.181 0.182 0.058 0.058   0.223 0.223   0.091 0.091 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1= FOREIGN t-1 3.90   47.67   4.12    3.18     3.83 
(p-value)    (0.05)   (<0.01)   (0.04)    (0.07)     (0.05) 
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Appendix III: Additional robustness tests 
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on institutional 
ownership for non-US firms from 2001 to 2013. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I. Column 
of Pred. Sign provides expected directional relations between the dependent variables and the main 
independent variables of interest. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** indicate significance level of less than 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
 
 Pred. 
Firm FE  Cluster by country 
Two-way  
clustering 
Delete zero  
INSTIT_OWN  
Exclude  
Japan RATIO 
Excl. 
financial 
crisis 
Add  
CROSS_ 
LISTING 
Add 
G_INDEX 
  Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.201** -0.353*** -0.353*** -0.366*** -0.342***  -0.355*** -0.348*** -0.131* 
    (-2.23) (-4.81) (-6.60) (-5.97) (-5.70)  (-4.96) (-6.10) (-1.89) 
FOREIGN t-1 - 0.050 -0.090 -0.090 -0.121* -0.077  -0.095 -0.086 0.037 
    (0.43) (-1.34) (-1.47) (-1.92) (-0.97)  (-1.01) (-1.19) (0.49) 
DOMESTIC t-1 / FOREIGN t-1  -      -0.002***    
         (-2.84)    
SIZE t-1  -0.044*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.017 
   (-2.90) (-5.63) (-8.64) (-4.94) (-5.72) (-7.31) (-5.48) (-6.98) (-1.65) 
ROA t-1  -0.370*** -0.621*** -0.621*** -0.669*** -0.561*** -0.648*** -0.671*** -0.626*** -0.006 
   (-6.40) (-5.29) (-5.86) (-13.28) (-14.01) (-15.13) (-13.66) (-16.20) (-0.39) 
MTB t-1  -0.001 -0.019* -0.019 -0.023** -0.022** -0.026** -0.020 -0.018* -0.482*** 
   (-0.07) (-1.79) (-1.54) (-2.07) (-2.13) (-2.42) (-1.58) (-1.83) (-2.99) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.007 0.033** 0.033 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.035** 0.048*** 0.033** -0.058 
   (0.44) (2.23) (1.54) (2.73) (2.69) (2.48) (2.80) (2.46) (-1.26) 
LEV t-1  0.304*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.163*** 0.241*** 0.228*** 0.250*** 0.230*** -0.083** 
   (5.35) (3.51) (3.72) (4.54) (6.42) (6.73) (6.60) (7.28) (-2.22) 
STDSALE t-1  0.171*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.393*** 0.388*** 0.397*** 0.432*** 0.399*** 0.095 
   (3.90) (9.49) (4.46) (10.06) (11.48) (12.23) (11.07) (13.05) (1.24) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY t-1  -0.063** -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.150*** -0.174*** -0.154*** -0.185*** -0.159*** -0.051*** 
   (-1.96) (-6.10) (-4.50) (-11.13) (-11.65) (-12.32) (-12.86) (-13.57) (-3.73) 
ANALYST t-1  0.012** -0.010** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.017*** 
   (2.06) (-2.52) (-2.70) (-2.29) (-3.14) (-4.53) (-3.16) (-2.91) (-3.22) 
ACC_STANDARD t-1  0.027* 0.035 0.035* 0.025* 0.020 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.034*** -0.024 
   (1.77) (1.60) (1.82) (1.73) (1.42) (2.68) (2.98) (2.70) (-0.84) 
GDPGROWTH t-1  -0.314 -0.418 -0.418 -0.443 -0.409 -0.304 0.551 -0.442* -1.189 
   (-1.02) (-0.81) (-0.66) (-1.31) (-1.40) (-1.08) (1.55) (-1.69) (-1.71) 
INFLATION t-1  0.778* 1.375 1.375** 1.829*** 0.651* 1.647*** 1.781*** 1.385*** 0.155 
   (1.83) (1.64) (1.98) (4.14) (1.77) (4.50) (3.79) (4.02) (0.26) 
CROSS_LISTING          -0.174***  
          (-3.23)  
G_INDEX          -0.123 
          (-0.89) 
CONSTANT, YEAR,  
FIRM, & COUNTRY FE  YES 
        
CONSTANT, YEAR,  
INDUSTRY, & COUNTRY FE    YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations   66,286 66,286 66,286 45,321 48,082 48,459 47,489 66,286 3,522 
Adj. R-squared   0.223 0.108 0.108 0.107 0.104 0.110 0.119 0.108 0.099 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1= FOREIGN t-1  3.11* 8.86*** 8.94*** 7.58*** 6.74***   4.65** 7.53*** 4.35** 
(p-value)  (0.08) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)  (0.03) (<0.01) (0.05) 
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TABLE 1  
Countries in the sample  
This table lists alphabetically countries used in this study. For each country, we also report country-level mean 
values of the aggregate earnings management measure (Agg. EM), ownership by domestic (DOMESTIC) and foreign 
(FOREIGN) institutional investors, and the legal origin and the stage of economic development of each country. The 
classification of legal origin is as defined in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The 
classification of economic development is based on the MSCI Developed and Emerging Markets Indices obtained 
from Bloomberg. All variable definitions are given in Appendix I. 
 
Country N Agg. EM DOMESTIC FOREIGN Legal origin Economic development 
Australia 3,560 0.537 0.016 0.045 Common Developed 
Austria 371 0.384 0.024 0.100 Civil Developed 
Belgium 560 0.453 0.033 0.071 Civil Developed 
Canada 1,645 0.371 0.145 0.056 Common Developed 
Denmark 545 0.476 0.113 0.056 Civil Developed 
Finland 815 0.423 0.109 0.090 Civil Developed 
France 3,417 0.419 0.038 0.055 Civil Developed 
Germany 3,023 0.507 0.050 0.075 Civil Developed 
Greece 581 0.796 0.005 0.050 Civil Developed 
Hong Kong 2,369 0.767 0.013 0.052 Common Developed 
India 3,514 0.739 0.050 0.036 Common Emerging 
Ireland 196 0.460 0.009 0.133 Common Developed 
Italy 1,023 0.455 0.019 0.066 Civil Developed 
Japan 18,204 0.392 0.027 0.031 Civil Developed 
Malaysia 2,593 0.530 0.008 0.023 Common Emerging 
Netherlands 597 0.384 0.071 0.141 Civil Developed 
New Zealand 320 0.430 0.019 0.029 Common Developed 
Norway 876 0.516 0.110 0.069 Civil Developed 
Philippines 434 0.616 0.001 0.043 Civil Emerging 
Portugal 287 0.427 0.036 0.039 Civil Developed 
Singapore 1,955 0.611 0.009 0.038 Common Developed 
South Africa 1,122 0.475 0.065 0.044 Common Emerging 
South Korea 2,911 0.573 0.001 0.053 Civil Emerging 
Spain 604 0.493 0.044 0.060 Civil Developed 
Sweden 1,631 0.502 0.150 0.053 Civil Developed 
Switzerland 1,226 0.396 0.077 0.097 Civil Developed 
Taiwan 4,856 0.578 0.012 0.038 Civil Emerging 
Thailand 1,025 0.553 0.008 0.036 Common Emerging 
UK 6,026 0.477 0.175 0.042 Common Developed 
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TABLE 2  
Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. The sample is constructed from the 
intersection of FactSet and Compustat Global, after excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-99) and imposing requisite 
data requirement. The sample consists of 66,286 firm-year observations or 2,724 institutions with equity holdings in 
11,403 non-US firms across 29 countries from 2001 to 2013. All variables are winsorized at the one percent level at 
each tail. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix I. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Pctl 25th Pctl 75th 
Panel A: Main dependent variables - earning management 
Agg. EM 66,286 0.496 0.263 0.865 0.158 0.495 
EM1 66,286 0.126 0.061 0.163 0.025 0.148 
EM2 66,286 0.083 0.041 0.127 0.017 0.090 
EM3 66,286 0.689 0.357 1.389 0.196 0.626 
        
Panel B: Main independent variables of interest - institutional ownership 
TOTAL 66,286 0.094 0.051 0.112 0.012 0.135 
DOMESTIC 66,286 0.049 0.016 0.080 0.001 0.058 
FOREIGN 66,286 0.046 0.016 0.069 0.003 0.060 
        
Panel C: Other control variables 
SIZE 66,286 5.925 5.842 1.670 4.813 6.974 
ROA 66,286 0.023 0.033 0.114 0.006 0.068 
MTB 66,286 0.493 0.123 0.649 0.012 0.876 
SALEGROWTH 66,286 0.106 0.052 0.381 -0.040 0.172 
LEV 66,286 0.154 0.114 0.154 0.016 0.247 
STDSALE 66,286 0.157 0.108 0.158 0.060 0.193 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY 66,286 0.569 0.516 0.393 0.250 0.824 
ANALYST 66,286 1.322 1.099 1.311 0.000 2.197 
ACC_STANDARD 66,286 0.387 0.000 0.487 0.000 1.000 
GDPGROWTH 66,286 0.024 0.022 0.028 0.009 0.037 
INFLATION 66,286 0.020 0.018 0.024 0.001 0.029 
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TABLE 3  
Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the key variables used in this study. We bolded correlation coefficients that are significant at 5% or better based on a 
two-tail test. 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 EM1 1.000                                   
2 EM2 0.301 1.000                                 
3 EM3 0.098 0.164 1.000                               
4 Agg. EM 0.347 0.316 0.881 1.000                             
5 TOTAL -0.038 -0.032 -0.063 -0.065 1.000                           
6 DOMESTIC -0.035 -0.030 -0.045 -0.053 0.800 1.000                         
7 FOREIGN -0.021 -0.016 -0.051 -0.045 0.716 0.158 1.000                       
8 SIZE -0.076 -0.182 -0.078 -0.078 0.256 0.015 0.404 1.000                     
9 ROA -0.062 -0.113 -0.101 -0.098 0.112 0.053 0.122 0.210 1.000                   
10 MTB 0.027 0.093 -0.030 -0.019 0.347 0.316 0.202 -0.135 -0.005 1.000                 
11 SALEGROWTH 0.054 0.108 0.006 0.034 0.034 0.027 0.023 -0.042 0.087 0.102 1.000               
12 LEV 0.043 -0.039 0.050 0.071 0.001 -0.020 0.026 0.276 -0.088 -0.019 -0.005 1.000             
13 STDSALE 0.134 0.144 0.095 0.117 -0.005 0.045 -0.061 -0.229 -0.082 0.148 0.079 -0.028 1.000           
14 CAPITAL_INTENSITY -0.043 -0.102 -0.111 -0.093 -0.104 -0.102 -0.053 0.183 -0.029 -0.170 -0.092 0.206 -0.243 1.000         
15 ANALYST -0.120 -0.112 -0.111 -0.129 0.420 0.215 0.437 0.516 0.145 0.193 -0.021 0.012 -0.101 0.021 1.000       
16 ACC_STANDARD 0.072 0.092 0.031 0.057 0.314 0.272 0.202 -0.040 -0.027 0.488 0.053 0.083 0.089 -0.157 0.034 1.000     
17 GDPGROWTH 0.027 0.040 0.022 0.034 -0.068 -0.069 -0.034 -0.043 0.122 -0.084 0.135 0.008 0.050 -0.024 -0.055 -0.173 1.000   
18 INFLATION 0.066 0.116 0.069 0.100 0.066 0.069 0.027 -0.104 0.082 0.064 0.137 0.137 0.124 -0.119 -0.093 0.154 0.438 1.000 
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TABLE 4  
The impact of institutional investors on earnings management 
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on institutional ownership 
using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 2001 to 2013. Dependent variable (Dep. Var.) is a composite measure based 
on a principal component analysis of three earnings management measures (Agg. EM). The main independent 
variables of interest are domestic (DOMESTIC) and foreign (FOREIGN) institutional ownership. All variable 
definitions are given in Appendix I. Each regression includes year, industry (based on two-digit SIC codes), and 
country fixed effects (FE). Column of Pred. Sign provides expected directional relations between the dependent 
variable and the main independent variables of interest. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** indicate significance level of less than 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 
  Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t 
  
Pred. 
Sign 
Baseline 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TOTAL t-1  -    -0.503***    -0.293***  
      (-14.91)    (-7.42)  
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.353***    -0.508***   -0.501*** 
   (-6.19)    (-10.65)   (-10.11) 
FOREIGN t-1 - -0.090    -0.473***   0.064 
   (-1.24)    (-7.72)   (0.91) 
SIZE t-1  -0.023***      0.002 0.005* 0.000 
   (-6.87)      (0.71) (1.76) (0.03) 
ROA t-1  -0.621***      -0.618*** -0.609*** -0.604*** 
   (-16.12)      (-16.11) (-15.91) (-15.75) 
MTB t-1  -0.019*      -0.072*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
   (-1.90)      (-10.05) (-8.49) (-8.46) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.033**      0.044*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 
   (2.44)      (3.29) (3.30) (3.24) 
LEV t-1  0.228***      0.393*** 0.380*** 0.391*** 
   (7.23)      (12.34) (12.02) (12.33) 
STDSALE t-1  0.397***      0.424*** 0.423*** 0.426*** 
   (12.99)      (13.43) (13.43) (13.52) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY t-1  -0.160***      -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.184*** 
   (-13.63)      (-16.52) (-16.98) (-16.79) 
ANALYST t-1  -0.010***      -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.058*** 
   (-2.92)      (-20.35) (-17.77) (-18.26) 
ACC_STANDARD t-1  0.035***      0.089*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 
   (2.73)      (8.72) (9.74) (9.61) 
GDPGROWTH t-1  -0.418      0.259 0.217 0.186 
   (-1.60)      (1.57) (1.32) (1.13) 
INFLATION t-1  1.375***      2.137*** 2.252*** 2.238*** 
   (3.99)      (9.05) (9.55) (9.47) 
CONSTANT  0.513***  0.544*** 0.543*** 0.504*** 0.496*** 0.523*** 
   (10.96)  (96.85) (96.54) (25.96) (25.55) (26.35) 
YEAR, INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE YES  NO NO NO NO NO 
Number of observations  66,286  66,286 66,286 66,286 66,286 66,286 
Adj. R-squared  0.108  0.004 0.004 0.052 0.053 0.054 
F-stat DOMESTICt-1 = FOREIGNt-1  7.58    0.17    40.47 
(p-value)  (<0.01)   (0.68)   (<0.01) 
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TABLE 5  
Additional evidence for the role of information costs  
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on institutional ownership 
using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 2001 to 2013. The sample is partitioned into high and low levels of 
information acquisition costs (INFO costs-H and INFO costs-L, respectively) based on median values. All variable 
definitions are given in Appendix I. Each regression includes a constant and year, industry (based on two-digit SIC 
codes), and country fixed effects (FE). Column of Pred. Sign provides expected directional relations between the 
dependent variable and the main independent variables of interest. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are 
t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** indicate significance level of less 
than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
    
Panel A: Partition by firm-level information acquisition and processing costs 
Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t  Firm Size  Analyst Coverage 
  Pred. 
Small 
(INFO costs-H) 
Large 
(INFO costs-L) Pred. 
Low 
(INFO costs-H) 
High 
(INFO costs-L) 
  Sign (1) (2) Sign (3) (4) 
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.403*** -0.295*** - -0.481*** -0.182*** 
   (-5.09) (-3.53)  (-5.41) (-2.61) 
FOREIGN t-1 - 0.130 -0.100 - 0.001 -0.053 
   (0.73) (-1.45)  (0.01) (-0.81) 
SIZE t-1  -0.006 -0.022***  -0.023*** -0.016*** 
   (-0.84) (-4.32)  (-4.46) (-3.86) 
ROA t-1  -0.584*** -0.908***  -0.593*** -0.680*** 
   (-13.06) (-11.09)  (-11.62) (-12.39) 
MTB t-1  -0.001 -0.019  -0.016 -0.016 
   (-0.07) (-1.41)  (-1.04) (-1.21) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.014 0.086***  0.047*** -0.013 
   (0.94) (3.04)  (2.78) (-0.88) 
LEV t-1  0.212*** 0.219***  0.322*** 0.047 
   (4.52) (5.11)  (7.22) (1.19) 
STDSALE t-1  0.423*** 0.376***  0.436*** 0.287*** 
   (10.11) (8.54)  (10.66) (7.23) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY t-1  -0.164*** -0.156***  -0.217*** -0.075*** 
   (-9.53) (-9.95)  (-12.65) (-5.51) 
ANALYST t-1  -0.021*** -0.004  -0.017 -0.008 
   (-3.44) (-0.82)  (-1.31) (-1.45) 
ACC_STANDARD t-1  0.030* 0.028  0.049** 0.017 
   (1.73) (1.54)  (2.52) (1.16) 
GDPGROWTH t-1  -0.833** 0.382  -0.608* 0.054 
   (-2.46) (0.91)  (-1.83) (0.12) 
INFLATION t-1  0.411 2.150***  1.158** 1.442** 
   (0.88) (4.01)  (2.55) (2.55) 
CONSTANT, YEAR,  
INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE 
 YES YES  YES YES 
Number of observations  33,100 33,186  36,466 29,820 
Adj. R-squared  0.094 0.121  0.098 0.102 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1 = FOREIGN t-1  7.01*** 3.00*  5.64** 1.82 
(p-value)  (<0.01) (0.08)  (0.02) (0.18) 
F-stat INFO costs-H (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) < INFO costs-L (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1)  
  4.47**  3.89** 
(p-value)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
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Panel B: Partition by country-level information acquisition and processing costs 
Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t  Prevalence of Insider Trading  Disclosure Quality 
 Pred. 
High 
(INFO costs-H) 
Low 
(INFO costs-L) Pred. 
Low 
(INFO costs-H) 
High 
(INFO costs-L) 
  Sign (1) (2) Sign (3) (4) 
DOMESTICt-1 - -0.463*** -0.296*** - -0.419*** -0.283*** 
   (-4.19) (-4.43)  (-5.42) (-3.40) 
FOREIGNt-1 - -0.053 -0.036 - -0.015 -0.146 
   (-0.40) (-0.47)  (-0.20) (-0.81) 
SIZEt-1  -0.013** -0.030***  -0.027*** -0.022*** 
   (-2.11) (-8.02)  (-7.43) (-3.06) 
ROAt-1  -0.799*** -0.522***  -0.676*** -0.569*** 
   (-11.11) (-11.53)  (-12.99) (-9.66) 
MTBt-1  0.001 -0.025**  -0.032*** -0.008 
   (0.04) (-2.27)  (-2.59) (-0.49) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.035 0.030*  0.014 0.059*** 
   (1.63) (1.79)  (0.86) (2.72) 
LEVt-1  0.367*** 0.084**  0.201*** 0.282*** 
   (6.74) (2.38)  (5.61) (4.71) 
STDSALE t-1  0.472*** 0.348***  0.433*** 0.351*** 
   (8.62) (9.84)  (11.22) (7.06) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITYt-1  -0.237*** -0.121***  -0.132*** -0.254*** 
   (-10.37) (-9.10)  (-9.84) (-10.68) 
ANALYSTt-1  -0.021*** -0.006  -0.008** -0.015** 
   (-3.50) (-1.46)  (-2.11) (-2.11) 
ACC_STANDARDt-1  0.007 0.030**  0.019 0.007 
   (0.32) (2.08)  (1.16) (0.33) 
GDPGROWTHt-1  -0.273 -0.941**  -1.348*** 1.829*** 
   (-0.71) (-2.29)  (-4.12) (3.26) 
INFLATIONt-1  0.506 1.542**  1.598*** 0.258 
   (-1.96) (-1.22)  (3.17) (0.46) 
CONSTANT, YEAR,  
INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE 
 YES YES  YES YES 
Number of observations  26,742 39,544  45,550 20,736 
Adj. R-squared  0.111 0.103  0.106 0.115 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1 = FOREIGN t-1  4.97** 6.01***  12.58*** 0.48 
(p-value)  (0.03) (0.01)  (<0.01) (0.49) 
F-stat INFO costs-H (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) < INFO costs-L (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) 
  3.61**  3.04** 
(p-value)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
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TABLE 6  
Proximity in region, accounting standards, and culture 
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on institutional ownership 
using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 2001 to 2013. All variable definitions are given in Appendix I. Each 
regression includes a constant and year, industry (based on two-digit SIC codes), and country fixed effects (FE). 
Column of Pred. Sign provides expected directional relations between the dependent variable and the main 
independent variables of interest. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance level of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
    Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t 
  
Pred. 
Sign 
Baseline 
(1) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.353***  -0.346*** -0.353*** -0.356*** 
    (-6.19)  (-6.08) (-6.19) (-6.26) 
FOREIGN t-1 - -0.090     
  (-1.24)     
FOREIGN_REGION t-1 -   -6.445*   
     (-1.84)   
FOREIGN_ACTG t-1 -    -0.192*  
      (-1.76)  
FOREIGN_CULTURE t-1 -     -0.294*** 
      (-3.02) 
SIZE t-1  -0.023***  -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
   (-6.87)  (-7.45) (-7.47) (-7.58) 
ROA t-1  -0.621***  -0.621*** -0.621*** -0.621*** 
   (-16.12)  (-16.11) (-16.09) (-16.10) 
MTB t-1  -0.019*  -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** 
   (-1.90)  (-2.01) (-2.03) (-2.09) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.033**  0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 
   (2.44)  (2.47) (2.45) (2.45) 
LEV t-1  0.228***  0.231*** 0.231*** 0.232*** 
   (7.23)  (7.34) (7.35) (7.37) 
STDSALE t-1  0.397***  0.396*** 0.398*** 0.398*** 
   (12.99)  (12.97) (13.02) (13.02) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY t-1  -0.160***  -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.158*** 
   (-13.63)  (-13.65) (-13.62) (-13.58) 
ANALYST t-1  -0.010***  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
   (-2.92)  (-3.59) (-3.36) (-3.93) 
ACC_STANDARD t-1  0.035***  0.034*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
   (2.73)  (2.70) (2.75) (2.69) 
GDPGROWTH t-1  -0.418  -0.426 -0.415 -0.427 
   (-1.60)  (-1.63) (-1.59) (-1.63) 
INFLATION t-1  1.375***  1.327*** 1.389*** 1.343*** 
   (3.99)  (3.86) (4.04) (3.90) 
CONSTANT, YEAR, INDUSTRY, & COUNTRY FE  YES  YES YES YES 
Number of observations    66,286 66,286 66,286 
Adj. R-squared    0.108 0.108 0.108 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1= FOREIGN_REGION t-1 /ACTG t-1 /CULTURE t-1  3.04* 0.32 0.31 
(p-value)             (0.08) (0.57) (0.58) 
Baseline (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) < DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN_REGION t-1 /ACTG t-1 /CULTURE t-1 
    5.50** 2.15* 3.46** 
(p-value)    (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) 
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TABLE 7  
Proclivity toward activism  
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on institutional ownership 
using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 2001 to 2013. In Panel A, the sample is separated into two groups based on 
the median value of free cash flow of the investee firms. In Panel B, the sample is separated into two groups based 
on whether the investee firms are located in countries with civil-law or common-law legal origins. All variable 
definitions are given in Appendix I. Each regression includes a constant and year, industry (based on two-digit SIC 
codes), and country fixed effects (FE). Column of Pred. Sign provides expected directional relations between the 
dependent variable and the main independent variables of interest. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are 
t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** indicate significance level of less 
than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Are foreign institutional investors more effective monitors in firms with greater agency problems? 
Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t  Free Cash Flow 
  Pred. 
Low 
(Agency costs-L) Pred. 
High 
(Agency costs-H) 
  Sign (1) (2) Sign (3) (4) 
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.293***  - -0.266***  
    (-3.22)    (-4.31)  
FOREIGN t-1  0.083  - -0.155*  
    (0.67)   (-1.95)  
DOMESTIC_INDEP t-1 -  -0.411*** -  -0.331*** 
    (-2.75)   (-3.73) 
FOREIGN_INDEP t-1   0.143 -  -0.231** 
   (0.77)   (-2.04) 
SIZE t-1  -0.036*** -0.037***  -0.018*** -0.019*** 
   (-7.59) (-7.89)  (-4.22) (-4.45) 
ROA t-1  -0.548*** -0.549***  -0.231*** -0.237*** 
   (-10.35) (-10.37)  (-4.68) (-4.79) 
MTB t-1  -0.009 -0.010  -0.014 -0.015 
   (-0.57) (-0.63)  (-1.19) (-1.23) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.013 0.013  0.097*** 0.097*** 
   (0.77) (0.78)  (4.47) (4.45) 
LEV t-1  0.153*** 0.152***  0.158*** 0.154*** 
   (3.54) (3.51)  (3.60) (3.51) 
STDSALE t-1  0.374*** 0.373***  0.402*** 0.401*** 
   (9.60) (9.54)  (9.20) (9.17) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY t-1  -0.142*** -0.141***  -0.105*** -0.104*** 
   (-7.52) (-7.49)  (-7.04) (-6.99) 
ANALYST t-1  -0.004 -0.004  -0.006 -0.006 
   (-0.64) (-0.65)  (-1.47) (-1.56) 
ACC_STANDARD t-1  0.046** 0.046**  0.023 0.023 
   (2.32) (2.33)  (1.50) (1.48) 
GDPGROWTH t-1  -0.911** -0.931**  0.406 0.364 
   (-2.25) (-2.30)  (1.31) (1.17) 
INFLATION t-1  2.911*** 2.900***  0.160 0.140 
    (5.12) (5.09)  (0.39) (0.35) 
CONSTANT, YEAR, INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Number of observations   35,590 35,590  30,996 30,996 
Adj. R-squared   0.121 0.114  0.094 0.099 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1 = FOREIGN t-1  5.42** 5.09**  1.20 0.46 
(p-value)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.27) (0.50) 
F-stat Agency costs-L (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) <  3.45**  
          Agency costs-H (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) (0.03)  
F-stat Agency costs-L (DOMESTIC_INDEP t-1 – FOREIGN_INDEP t-1) <  4.95*** 
          Agency costs-H (DOMESTIC_INDEP t-1 – FOREIGN_INDEP t-1) (0.01) 
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Panel B: Are foreign institutional investors more effective monitors in countries with weaker corporate governance? 
Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t Pred. 
Common Law  
(COM) 
 
Pred. 
Civil Law  
(CIV) 
  Sign (1) (2)  Sign (3) (4) 
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.307*** -0.305***   - -0.390*** -0.400*** 
   (-3.82) (-3.78)    (-5.02) (-5.18) 
FOREIGN t-1 - -0.047    - -0.038  
   (-0.30)     (-0.50)  
FOREIGN_COM t-1   0.104   -  -0.116* 
    (0.75)     (-1.67) 
FOREIGN_CIV t-1   0.786**     0.234 
    (2.22)     (1.57) 
SIZE t-1  -0.022*** -0.023***    -0.025*** -0.026*** 
   (-3.38) (-3.75)    (-6.82) (-7.19) 
ROA t-1  -0.439*** -0.437***    -0.857*** -0.861*** 
   (-8.63) (-8.63)    (-13.67) (-13.73) 
MTB t-1  -0.017 -0.019    -0.024* -0.026* 
   (-1.21) (-1.33)    (-1.77) (-1.95) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.058*** 0.058***    -0.009 -0.009 
   (3.35) (3.35)    (-0.45) (-0.45) 
LEV t-1  0.244*** 0.243***    0.224*** 0.225*** 
   (4.30) (4.29)    (6.10) (6.14) 
STDSALE t-1  0.340*** 0.340***    0.455*** 0.456*** 
   (7.71) (7.72)    (11.02) (11.04) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITY t-1  -0.214*** -0.214***    -0.149*** -0.148*** 
   (-9.49) (-9.49)    (-10.86) (-10.83) 
ANALYST t-1  -0.014** -0.018***    -0.008** -0.011*** 
   (-2.23) (-2.79)    (-2.02) (-2.80) 
ACC_STANDARD t-1  0.015 0.012    -0.003 -0.002 
   (0.79) (0.63)    (-0.16) (-0.10) 
GDPGROWTH t-1  0.130 0.112    -0.639* -0.666* 
   (0.29) (0.25)    (-1.79) (-1.86) 
INFLATION t-1  0.708 0.701    1.152** 1.198** 
    (1.36) (1.35)     (2.26) (2.36) 
CONSTANT, YEAR, INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE  YES YES   YES YES 
Number of observations   23,734 23,734     42,552 42,552 
Adj. R-squared   0.105 0.105     0.112 0.112 
F-stat DOMESTIC t-1 = FOREIGN t-1    6.33***    9.20***  
(p-value)  (0.01)    (<0.01)  
F-stat COM (FOREIGN_COM t-1) >  CIV (FOREIGN_COM t-1) 2.48* 
(p-value) (0.06) 
F-stat COM (FOREIGN_CIV t-1) > CIV (FOREIGN_CIV t-1) 2.57* 
(p-value) (0.05) 
F-stat COM (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) < CIV (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) 0.03 
(p-value) (0.44) 
F-stat COM (DOMESTIC t-1 – FOREIGN_CIV t-1) < CIV (DOMESTIC t-1 – FOREIGN_COM t-1) 3.09** 
(p-value) (0.04) 
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TABLE 8  
Superior monitoring technology  
This table reports estimation results from panel regressions of earnings management on institutional ownership 
using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 2001 to 2013. The sample is separated into two groups based on whether the 
investee firms are located in emerging countries (EMERG) or developed countries (DEVELOP). All variable 
definitions are given in Appendix I. Each regression includes a constant and year, industry (based on two-digit SIC 
codes), and country fixed effects (FE). Column of Pred. Sign provides expected directional relations between the 
dependent variable and the main independent variables of interest. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are 
t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** indicate significance level of less 
than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var. = Agg. EM t Pred. 
Developed Countries 
(DEVELOP) Pred. 
Emerging Countries 
(EMERG) 
  Sign (1) (2) Sign (3) (4) 
DOMESTIC t-1 - -0.303*** -0.305*** - -0.380*** -0.381*** 
   (-5.16) (-5.20)  (-3.44) (-3.44) 
FOREIGN t-1 - -0.045  - -0.174**  
   (-0.56)   (-1.98)  
FOREIGN_DEVELOP t-1   -0.060 -  -0.169* 
    (-0.68)   (-1.87) FOREIGN_EMERG t-1   0.156   -0.292      (0.83)   (-0.67) SIZE t-1  -0.027*** -0.027***  -0.008** -0.009** 
   (-7.76) (-7.76)  (-2.35) (-2.36) 
ROA t-1  -0.527*** -0.527***  -0.812*** -0.813*** 
   (-12.90) (-12.90)  (-15.29) (-15.26) 
MTB t-1  -0.023** -0.023**  0.052** 0.052** 
   (-2.22) (-2.20)  (2.18) (2.19) 
SALEGROWTH t-1  0.037** 0.037**  0.020* 0.020* 
   (2.44) (2.43)  (1.89) (1.91) 
LEV t-1  0.107*** 0.107***  0.188*** 0.189*** 
   (3.22) (3.21)  (6.45) (6.46) 
STDSALE t-1  0.397*** 0.397***  0.280*** 0.281*** 
   (11.92) (11.93)  (9.26) (9.26) 
CAPITAL_INTENSITYt-1  -0.125*** -0.125***  -0.185*** -0.185*** 
   (-10.28) (-10.27)  (-13.47) (-13.49) 
ANALYSTt-1  -0.008** -0.008*  -0.016*** -0.016*** 
   (-2.04) (-1.96)  (-4.13) (-4.13) 
ACC_STANDARDt-1  0.024* 0.024*  0.021* 0.021* 
   (1.78) (1.79)  (1.67) (1.66) 
GDPGROWTHt-1  -0.801** -0.799**  0.196 0.199 
   (-2.20) (-2.20)  (1.07) (1.08) 
INFLATIONt-1  1.470*** 1.468***  -0.100 -0.104 
   (2.60) (2.59)   (-0.45) (-0.46) 
CONSTANT, YEAR, INDUSTRY & COUNTRY FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Number of observations   49,831 49,831   16,455 16,455 
Adj. R-squared   0.105 0.105   0.124 0.124 
F-stat DOMESTICt-1 = FOREIGNt-1    6.34***   2.07  (p-value)  (0.01)   (0.15)  
F-stat DEVELOP (FOREIGN_ DEVELOP t-1)  > EMERG (FOREIGN_ DEVELOP t-1) 2.08* 
(p-value) (0.07) 
F-stat DEVELOP (FOREIGN_ EMERG t-1)  > EMERG (FOREIGN_ EMERG t-1)  0.87 
(p-value) (0.18) 
F-stat DEVELOP (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) < EMERG (DOMESTIC t-1 - FOREIGN t-1) 0.71 
(p-value) (0.20) 
F-stat DEVELOP (DOMESTIC t-1 – FOREIGN_ EMERG t-1) <  4.20** 
          EMERG (DOMESTIC t-1 – FOREIGN_ DEVELOP t-1) (0.02) 
 
